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This paper analyzes the role of social cohesion in economic and institutional development and, broadly, 
the creation of welfare in Latin America. The paper defines the concept of social cohesion with reference 
to the notions of social capital and inequality. Using data and literature on Latin America, the paper 
argues that low interpersonal trust and entrenched inequality interfere with cohesion. The paper develops 
and introduces an exploratory index of cohesion structured around the definition proposed. Relying on 
correlations, and with appropriate caveats, the paper uses this index to explore tentative linkages between 
levels of cohesion and development outcomes. The paper presents evidence of positive linkages among 
social cohesion and economic growth, investment and innovation capacity, governmental effectiveness, 
the quality of public policies, and the predictability of the policy environment. Finally, the paper discusses 
the significance of these findings and some of the policy implications. 
Keywords:  social cohesion, social capital, trust, inequality, exclusion, opportunities, governance, 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
Economic development and human welfare are complex propositions and the consequences of many 
factors. The satisfaction of material needs is but a partial answer to the broader question of what 
happiness is and how improvements in the quality of life can be secured. Income is an important aspect, 
but so are other dimensions of fulfillment and contentment, in particular physical and mental well-being, 
trust and respect, dignity, belonging, and the degree of control over one’s destiny and life. 
Although income is positively correlated with some of these dimensions, the literature shows that 
the relationship between income and broader indicators of welfare is often tenuous and sometimes 
negative. For example, examining causes of welfare gains in developing and Organization of Economic 
Development and Cooperation (OECD) countries over time, Charles Kenny and Anthony Kenny (2006: 
100) find that government intervention, technology, and institutions, not national income, were critical to 
securing improvements in public health. Their analysis leads them to conclude that for “the great majority 
of countries, it is likely that the causal link from welfare improvements to economic growth is 
considerably stronger than the causal link from economic growth to improvements in welfare.” 
The case for including nonincome measures in analyses of development, welfare, and the quality 
of life, therefore, seems strong. This paper addresses one such aspect—social cohesion—that can be 
thought of as an end in itself and as a means to achieve other objectives, such as faster economic growth. 
Social cohesion refers to the level and nature of satisfaction of individuals’ relational needs 
together with the sense of belonging and solidarity that is generated by a system structured to ensure the 
welfare of all. This paper treats social cohesion as an asset for economic development and the creation of 
welfare. It can be argued, for example, that meeting the challenges of sustainable growth in a context of 
increasing globalization requires flexible, yet cohesive societies able to share the costs of adjusting to 
changing market conditions and to sustain quality investments in infrastructure and in the education of the 
workforce. In principle, societies with high levels of social cohesion will be better positioned to face these 
challenges and more responsive at the individual level and in organizational terms. 
The second section of this paper examines the application of the concept of social cohesion to 
policy discussions by looking at how it has been defined and used in certain settings and in the academic 
literature. The third section discusses the relevance of the concept for development in Latin America 
given the region’s historically high levels of social and economic inequality and exclusion and relatively 
weak mechanisms of social protection. We develop a social cohesion index in section four that allows 
exploration in section five of how social cohesion relates to outcomes linked to development, including 
the rate of economic growth, technological innovation capacity, governmental effectiveness, political 
stability, and the quality and predictability of the policy environment. Section six concludes the paper and 
spells out some of the implications for the choice and design of policy and public action. In the 
appendices, we define the variables used in the construction of the index, discuss methodological aspects, 




2.  SOCIAL COHESION: DEFINITIONS AND APPLICATIONS 
In recent years, the concept of social cohesion, and that of social capital, has become more widely used in 
policy-related discussions of governments and international organizations as well as in academic studies. 
As such, these concepts have attracted interest as policy goals (or as frameworks for organizing policy 
debates) and as points of reference for social scientific analysis (Beauvais and Jenson, 2002; Bernard, 
1999). With respect to social cohesion, however, work is at an early stage and is limited by a lack of 
agreement on the definition and applicability of the concepts and the deficiency of existing measures in 
terms of both their conceptual validity and their coverage. 
This section examines different definitions and uses of the concepts based on a selective survey 
of theoretical and empirical literature. It addresses social cohesion first and then deals with social capital, 
inequality, and exclusion, linking them to the notion of cohesion. 
Social Cohesion 
In a policymaking context, one of the first uses of the concept of social cohesion was in relation to the 
process of regional integration in Europe. European law favors actions to strengthen economic and social 
cohesion as a means of promoting the harmonious development of Europe,
1 an objective that requires the 
reduction of disparities among countries and regions. 
The Council of Europe
2 recently outlined a strategy in which it set social cohesion as a priority 
goal for European countries.
3 In the document, social cohesion is defined as “the capacity of a society to 
ensure the welfare of all its members, minimizing disparities and avoiding polarization.” Thus, in this 
context social cohesion is defined in large part as a policy goal focused on ensuring that all citizens have 
an opportunity to improve their situation and are guaranteed basic social rights such as decent living 
standards and adequate health care. 
Social cohesion also plays a role in framing policy discussions in Canada, with the creation of a 
social cohesion network and the publication of a report on social cohesion by the Canadian senate. The 
Canadian interest in the concept arose in part from the perception that the forces of globalization were 
contributing to the exacerbation of social cleavages and weakening the traditional axes of community 
identification, including democratic values, mutual attachments, and willingness to engage in collective 
action (Jeannotte, 2003). The Social Cohesion Network got underway in 1998 with a values-based 
definition of social cohesion as “the ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared 
challenges, and equal opportunity within Canada, based on a sense of trust, hope, and reciprocity among 
all Canadians.” It is worth noting that in 2002, the network adopted a more behavioral definition 
reminiscent of some of the discussions regarding social capital referred to below: “social cohesion is 
based on the willingness of individuals to cooperate and work together at all levels of society to achieve 
collective goals” (Jeannotte, 2003: 3). 
The governments of several other countries, including those of Australia, Denmark, France, and 
New Zealand, have also focused on social cohesion, partly to highlight the close connections between 
social and economic policy and the need to coordinate policy actions across multiple sectors. The 
definition the government of New Zealand developed is perhaps the most comprehensive: “Social 
cohesion describes a society where different groups and institutions knit together effectively despite 
differences. It reflects a high degree of willingness to work together, taking into account diverse needs 
and priorities. Social cohesion is underpinned by…individual opportunities (including education, jobs, 
health); family well-being (including parental responsibility); strong communities (including safe and 
                                                      
1 Title 5, Article 130A, Official Journal L 169, June 29, 1987, p. 0009. 
2 The Council of Europe was established in 1949. It consists of 46 member countries and has its headquarters in Strasbourg, 
France. The Council of Europe is not an institution of the European Community (composed of 25 member states), though no 
country has entered the union without first belonging to the Council of Europe. 
3 The Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion, approved by the Council of Europe in March 2004 (Council of Europe, 2004).  
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reliant communities); and national identity (including history, heritage, culture, and rights and 
entitlements of citizenship)” (quoted from Senate of Canada, Standing Committee on Social Affairs, 
Science and Technology, 1999). 
The focus on social cohesion of multilateral development institutions, such as the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), builds on many years of development-related research. 
This research points to the complementary nature of efforts to reduce inequality (such as by investments 
in human capital through expenditures on education, health care, and social protection) and to promote 
sustainable development. More recent research highlights the importance of the development of such 
factors as political stability, transparent and accountable government, and social capital. In work at the 
IDB, the goal of building social cohesion has been viewed to entail a focus on reducing social exclusion 
and inequality and on enhancing social solidarity, in terms of building both more cooperative relations 
among citizens and a greater degree of civic responsibility in citizens’ relations with public institutions 
(Bouillon, Buvinic, and Jarque, 2004). ECLAC, the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, recently has taken up these thoughts, noting that in its region of focus 
the notion of social cohesion has emerged as a potentially helpful response in building solutions to such 
persistent problems as extreme inequality and forms of exclusion that date back to the distant past 
(ECLAC, 2007a). 
The theoretical literature identifies a number of dimensions of the concept of social cohesion, 
with some researchers choosing to limit their focus on particular constituent elements and others taking a 
broader approach. For instance, Jenson (1998) and Bernard (1999) adopt a comprehensive approach in 
which social cohesion comprises six dimensions: (1) equality–inequality, (2) recognition–rejection 
(referring to the degree of respect and toleration of differences), (3) legitimacy–illegitimacy (with respect 
to the institutions that act as mediators of social relations), (4) inclusion–exclusion (as regards the degree 
of equality of social and economic opportunities), (5) belonging–isolation (involving the extent of shared 
values, identities, and feelings of commitment), and (6) participation–noninvolvement. 
Other researchers have chosen narrower definitions. The Council of Europe, as noted above, 
centers its definition on the objectives of minimizing social and economic disparities and ensuring 
opportunities for all. Another group of researchers has emphasized the importance of shared values and a 
sense of community belonging (Chan, Chan, and To, 2003; Dahrendorf et al. 1995 Maxwell, 1996; 
Miller, 1998). For example, Chan, Chan, and To feel that in a cohesive society “citizens can trust, help, 
and cooperate with their fellow members of society, share a common identity or sense of belonging to 
their society, and the subjective feelings in the first two points are manifested in objective behavior.” 
Other researchers have focused on an ability to work together (Canadian Social Cohesion Network in 
Jeannotte, 2003; Reimer and Wilkinson, 2003; Ritzen, Easterly, and Woolcock, 2000) or on the strength 
of community bonds. 
In an effort to bring together these various approaches, Berger-Schmitt (2000) identifies two main 
societal dimensions in the concept of social cohesion. The first dimension is the reduction of disparities of 
opportunities, inequalities, and social exclusion and the second is the strengthening of the “density and 
quality of relationships and interactions between individuals or groups, their mutual feelings of 
commitment and trust due to common values and norms, and a sense of belonging and solidarity…” 
Thus, one dimension has to do with the extent of social exclusion/inclusion and the other with social 
capital. 
The definition of social cohesion adopted in this paper is based on this two-dimensional 
perspective of the concept: Social cohesion entails a capacity for cooperation and solidarity in society 
based on an equitable distribution of opportunities to participate in economic, social, and political life, as 
well as trust in societal rules, institutions, and fellow citizens. Understood in this way, the concept of 
social cohesion can be operationalized in terms of two separate (but, as we shall see, interacting) 
dimensions. 
The first dimension focuses on the extent of social capital that is present, that is, the degree to 
which citizens are able to work together because they trust each other. Where there is a lack of basic trust 
in institutions and fellow citizens, the scope for mutually beneficial transactions between individuals and  
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societal groups is narrow. The second dimension centers on the degree of equality in the distribution of 
opportunities. For example, only if citizens have the opportunity to find adequate work and have some 
guarantee of protection of their personal security, livelihood, and health are they likely to share a sense of 
responsibility for, feel part of, and be willing to contribute to the community and the society in which 
they live. 
Social Capital 
The idea of social capital is not new in the social sciences. The notion of relational arrangements and 
cooperation “recaptures an insight present since the very beginnings of the discipline” (Portes, 1998: 2). 
In the past decade there has been growing interest in this area. In 2000, the topic of social capital occurred 
in about a quarter of the absolute number of citations in EconLit, a database of publications in economics 
(Fabio Sabatini, 2006: 3, citing Isham et al., 2002). 
The definitions of social capital vary widely in this literature, but there is also some degree of 
consensus around the positive contribution of trust and certain types of social engagement and 
cooperation to growth and well-being (Franke, 2005: 2). Indeed, the problem of trust has been singled out 
as one of the most fundamental challenges in organizations and society at large (Ostrom, 1998; Rothstein 
and Stolle, 2002) on the intuition that “trust acts like a lubricant that makes any group or organization run 
more efficiently” (Fukuyama, 1999: 16). This intuition is supported more formally in standard 
noncooperative game theory, which makes it clear that “it makes no sense to support solutions for the 
common good if you do not trust most other agents to do the same” (Rothstein and Stolle, 2002: 2). 
The instrumental value of social capital for public and private organizations is evident from 
studies showing that “enterprises devote an ever more relevant part of their financial resources to 
activities which are not directly related to production processes,” including, for example, “nurturing a 
cooperative climate inside the workforce and building trustworthy relationships with external partners” 
and clients (Sabatini, 2006: 2). 
Social capital is often invoked in public policymaking, where it has been understood both as a 
factor affecting the achievement of collective benefits and as an outcome indicator of welfare, as 
exemplified by the Canadian government and international financial institutions such as the World Bank 
(See Fine, 2001; Franke, 2005; Grootaert and Bastelaer, 2002; Harriss, 2002; and Sabatini, 2006). In 
2003, the Canadian government mandated the Policy Research Initiative (PRI) to operationalize the 
concept of social capital as a public policy tool, declaring, “The concept of social capital is important for 
the government of Canada because it brings together the theoretical and empirical rationale for 
considering social ties as a potentially important ingredient of well-being and prosperity in society” 
(Franke, 2005: 37). 
The PRI developed an operational framework for social capital based on a social network 
approach in which social capital is defined as “the social networks that may provide access to resources 
and social support” (Franke, 2005: 9). By contrast, the OECD considers social capital as an outcome and, 
in particular, emphasizes its value as an indicator of social well-being (Franke, 2005: 3–4). Similarly, the 
British Office of National Statistics (2001) uses it as a measure of the degree of social integration. 
In addition to differences in the perspective regarding the flow and direction of causality, there 
are differences in the appropriate levels and units of analysis (Franke, 2005; Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 
2002). Three main approaches have guided the study of social capital in international organizations and, 
more broadly, the public sector: the microapproach (i.e., relations between individuals), the 
mesoapproach (i.e., relations between groups), and the macroapproach (i.e., the “structural” environment 
in which relations take place). 
In the microapproach, social capital delineates the potential for individual cooperation through 
the formation of groups and associations to strengthen collective capacities. The mesoapproach concerns 
social networks and their value in providing resources, such as information and assistance, to individuals 
and groups. The macroapproach focuses on the structures (e.g., institutional, socioeconomic, and  
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political) that create the enabling environment for social engagement and civic and political participation 
(Franke, 2005). 
Among scholars, there is some agreement that social capital is multidimensional, context 
dependent, and dynamic (Sabatini, 2006). The literature comprises three basic approaches represented by 
the work of Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman, and Robert Putnam (see Adam and Rončević, 2003; Portes, 
1998; Sabatini, 2006). 
Bourdieu emphasizes the instrumental value of social capital, stressing the potential benefits of 
participation and social connectedness in enhancing access to economic resources, cultural capital, and 
valued credentials. He defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which 
are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition…” (Bourdieu, 1986: 248). He identifies three types of capital: economic, 
cultural (or human), and social. With this distinction, he aims to build a theory that explains how the 
different types of capital relate to each other and accumulate and how people tend to convert some forms 
of capital into others to preserve their social positions and resources. 
Emphasizing the similarity with other forms of capital, Coleman highlights the productive nature 
of social capital (1990: 302). According to this author, social capital “is defined by its function. It is not a 
single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: they all consist of 
some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors—whether persons or corporate 
actors—within the structure” (Coleman, 1988: S98). 
Putnam, who, as is well known, has greatly contributed to the popularization of the concept of 
social capital, defines social capital in his 1993 work with Leonardi and Nanetti as a “feature of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993: 167). In a subsequent work, he highlights the interplay between 
group membership and the development of trust and cooperation. Social capital is seen as the 
“connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that 
arise from them” (Putnam, 2000: 19). 
In the definitions of these three scholars, as well as those of several others, trust is often singled 
out as the essence of social capital. Fukuyama, for instance, essentially equates social capital with trust 
(see also Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Rothstein and Stolle, 2002): 
Social capital is a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts 
of it. (Fukuyama, 1995: 26) 
Social capital can be defined simply as an instantiated set of informal values or norms shared 
among members of a group that permits them to cooperate with one another. If members of the group 
come to expect that others will behave reliably and honestly, then they will come to trust one another. 
(Fukuyama, 1999: 16) 
Restricting the concept to informal values or norms, as Fukuyama does, can be problematic. It is 
clear that cooperation, in part, arises from individual motivations, which may be “informal.” But the 
climate for cooperation emerging from trust and shared values and norms is not exclusively based on 
informality. To a considerable extent, norms and values are created and fostered through formal 
institutions and/or externally enforced rules, implying some degree of formality in many kinds of shared 
values and rules. Norms and rules are often transcribed into laws, which serve to organize society. 
As in the case of physical, financial, and human capital, social capital is an asset that mediates 
access to resources and benefits such as status, information, income, power, and influence. Following 
Bourdieu, it is therefore important to understand how different forms of capital operate in terms of their 
“mediating” nature and how they interrelate.
4 Reflecting on these differences, Portes (1998: 7) points out 
the unspecified time and terms of repayment of social capital as opposed to the case in the context of 
purely economic and financial exchange. Comparing the mobility and transferability of social capital with 
economic or physical capital, Arrow (1999) notes that with the former it is more difficult to change 
ownership. 
                                                      
4 Franke (2005) develops a hypothetical development trajectory of the relative sizes of different types of capital.  
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Numerous studies have highlighted the shortcomings, ambiguities, and uncertainties of the causes 
and effects that haunt empirical work on social capital even within the same conceptual (or definitional) 
tradition. It is difficult “to devise a single concept and a single valid measure of social capital” (Adam and 
Rončević, 2003: 160; see also: Arrow, 1999; Durlauf, 2002a; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004; Sabatini, 
2006). Sabatini makes the point that although there is recognition that social capital is a multidimensional 
concept, empirical research tends to focus on partial aspects, ignoring social and historical circumstances 
and concentrating on one type of network while, nonetheless, generalizing the findings to the entire 
population. Sabatini regrets the lack of a good “micro theory explaining trust transmission mechanisms 
from groups to the entire society” and the fact that “the logic underlying the connection between social 
ties and generalized trust has never been clearly developed” (Sabatini, 2006:12; see also Rosenblum, 
1998; Uslaner, 2002). 
And yet, although they criticize the definition and uses of the concept, many of these studies 
accept its intuitive value. Durlauf (2002b) argues that social capital research has had a “salutary effect on 
economics” through its “introduction of richer sociology into standard reasoning.” But he recognizes 
basic definitional problems, along with econometric difficulties, concerning the exchangeability and 
identification of the models specified, which in turn call into question the causal role often ascribed to 
social capital. 
It is precisely to deal with these shortcomings that authors such as Portes (1998: 6) emphasize the 
need to distinguish between the sources and owners of social capital and the benefits engendered or 
pursued. Along the same lines, Sabatini (2006: 11) stresses the importance of finding direct measures of 
social capital to overcome the confusion that exists between social capital, on the one hand, and the 
benefits that it is believed to convey, on the other. 
Aside from the conceptual and methodological discussion, there is the issue of the intrinsic 
instrumental value of social capital. There is some agreement that certain types of social capital, or groups 
bound by social capital, may have negative effects on individuals and communities, subtracting from the 
common good (Durlauf, 2002b; Fukuyama, 2000; Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Olson, 1982; Portes, 1998; 
Smith, [1776] 1991). According to Portes (1998: 15), negative consequences of social capital include 
exclusion of outsiders and restricted access to opportunities, excessive claims on group members, 
restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward leveling norms. 
In this context, Putnam distinguishes between bridging and bonding social capital. Bonding social 
capital refers to social ties between the members of relatively closed and homogeneous communities that 
tend to pursue narrow and particularistic interests, often against the common good. Bridging social 
capital, in turn, refers to what Granovetter (1973, 1985) calls “weak social ties,” which appear in more 
diverse and open communities that may or may not favor links and cooperative exchanges with other 
networks. 
Inequality and Exclusion 
Bonding social capital in the absence of bridging social capital can lead to dysfunctionality in the way 
society operates by excluding some groups from the benefits and opportunities that others effectively 
enjoy. Critical literature on social capital, inequality, and exclusion includes explorations of why 
inequality in social capital among groups may tend to persist. Following Lin (2000), for example, social 
groups may have different access to social capital because of their advantaged or disadvantaged structural 
positions and associated networks. According to Mogues and Carter (2005: 5), economic inequality is 
most persistent and difficult to address when it is socially (and, one might add, culturally) embedded 
(“…social capital in this model may itself generate exclusion and deepen social and economic 
cleavages”). Figueroa, in a series of writings on inequality, social networks, and social exclusion, makes 
similar points (for example, Figueroa, 2003), whereas Cleaver (2005) indicates how social relationships, 




These papers (and others) thus provide frameworks (more or less formalized, depending on the 
paper) whereby one understands how social capital dynamics may generate and entrench economic 
inequality and exclusion. Esteban and Ray (1994) develop the concept of polarization (as different from 
inequality) to elucidate the point. The co-existence of different clusters of society with very dissimilar 
attributes in their analysis can generate social tension, unrest, and outright revolution and revolt. 
The point that this discussion enables us to make is that cohesion, as defined above for the level 
of society as a whole, is a consequence of the interaction between social capital, on the one hand, and 
inequality and exclusion, on the other. High levels of social cohesion are consistent with the combination 
of high levels of social capital and low levels of inequality and exclusion. The three other possible 
combinations of levels of social capital and inequality/exclusion are in this model associated with low 
social cohesion. A later section of this paper attempts to quantify these combinations using multiple 
indicators for a number of societies (or countries) in Latin America as a whole. Before we get there, a 





3.  SHIFTING TO LATIN AMERICA: DEVELOPMENT UNDER CONDITIONS OF 
INEQUALITY AND DISTRUST 
Latin American countries display characteristics that by the above definitions would seem to interfere 
with social cohesion. In particular, trust is scarce in the region, and inequality is pronounced. 
The problem of trust is addressed in opinion surveys, for example, and according to these, Latin 
Americans trust members of their families and their friends but rarely trust fellow citizens 
(Latinobarómetro, 2006: 29–32). Trust in public institutions is very low because people feel they treated 
them unfairly and inequitably although trust in public institutions can grow as a consequence of positive 
experiences with them. Latinobarómetro data for 2006 suggest that 56 percent of the people consider 
themselves discriminated against in their dealings with institutions. Another 19 percent are of the opinion 
that they are treated unfairly because they are poor. Figure 1 suggests that Latin America lags behind 
other world regions, except sub-Saharan Africa, when it comes to “interpersonal trust.” One should 
expect the society-wide predisposition for consensus and cooperation, therefore, to be low, a situation that 
does not preclude the presence of workable or even high levels of within-group coherence and trust. 
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Sources: For world region averages, World Values Survey, 1999–2001 (single surveys administered in either 1999, 2000, or 
2001). For Latin American countries, values represent the average of results from Latinobarómetro for 1999/2000 and 2001. 
Note: Based on responses to the following questions: “Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust the majority of 
people or that one can never be too careful in dealing with others? Most people can be trusted or you can never be too careful 




Regarding the distribution of income, Latin America is still generally regarded as the world’s 
most unequal region, with a coefficient of inequality greater than 0.5 (Table 1). The distribution of 
income and wealth, and that of the underlying productive assets, thus, is highly skewed, as is access to 
such goods as basic services, credit, education, health care, and productive jobs. 
The distribution of income in individual countries is not necessarily static over time. In fact, 
Ferreira, Leite, and Litchfield (2006), for example, calculate Gini coefficients for Brazil of 0.574 in 1981, 
0.625 in 1989, and 0.564 in 2004, a decline in inequality of some 10 percent between the latter two points 
in time, due in part to new approaches in redistributive policy and some income convergence between 
rural and urban areas. However, whereas income inequality has recently declined somewhat in Brazil, 
Mexico, and Peru, it has increased in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador (same source as Figure 2). 
Deep inequality that changes little over time manifests itself at the country level in Latin America 
in income distributions that are rather flat up to decile 8 (if not 9) and top-heavy, with the richest decile 
capturing 40 percent or more of total income (Figure 2 in three panels). This pattern implies that although 
the differences in average absolute incomes among the deciles of the middle segment (here defined as 
deciles 3 to 8) are relatively small, the mean income of this numerically and politically important group is 
low. This has important implications for the dynamics of poverty, the prospects for inclusive, 
participatory growth, and (by our definition), social cohesion. The very poor tend to linger in the lowest 
two deciles and, indeed, the incidence of “extreme” poverty (using national poverty lines) is currently 
estimated at some 15 percent. The flatness of the distributions in Figure 2 implies, however, that a large 
segment of the population is concentrated near the poverty line. This suggests the presence of many low-
income “near-poor” who can easily (and in fact—as shown by household panel surveys—often do) fall 
into poverty as a result of unemployment and other shocks even as some of those officially considered 
poor may exit poverty with or without the help of redistributive programs of the state. The prospects of 
large numbers of people are thus compromised and the implications for social cohesion dim, although the 
overall environment of growth—which has been relatively dynamic in recent years—can be expected to 
influence the net picture at particular points in time. 










Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database Online 
*Latest year available by country/region. 
The forces underpinning inequality as described are multiple and entrenched. A meaningful way 
to frame the analysis is with reference to the concept of social exclusion—the very antithesis of cohesion 
and trust. Exclusion is a multidimensional process that affects the “functionings” and well-being of 
individuals and groups and tends to reproduce itself through discrimination, via unresponsive institutions, 
and in the market place. Exclusion can be “structural” or dynamic in nature and subject to change, 
depending on processes and developments in governance, public policy, and the economic, social, and 
cultural spheres (IDB, 2007). 
Region Coefficient 
OECD   0.321 
Eastern Europe, Central Asia  0.335 
South Asia   0.374 
Middle East, North Africa  0.385 
East Asia, Pacific  0.399 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.420 
Latin America, Caribbean  0.521  
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Source: Socioeconomic database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank) 

















































































































The “structural” view of exclusion links it to innate factors over which the excluded have little or 
no control, including particular ethnoracial origins and traits such as gender, age, physical ability, and 
place of residence (since poverty is often linked to geographic isolation). 
Ethnoracial exclusion potentially affects a vast segment of the population of the region, including 
more than 40 million indigenous persons and approximately 150 million persons of African descent. As 
can be seen in Figure 3, in 12 of the 13 countries for which information is presented, the people of 
indigenous and African origin are overrepresented among the very poor. In seven countries, the incidence 
of extreme poverty among these groups is more than twice that in the rest of the population. According to 
the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 2001, in Brazil the total 
population in poverty declined by five million between 1992 and 2001, but among those of African 
descent, the number of persons living in poverty rose by 500,000. Unemployment is greater and wage 
levels are lower in this group than in the overall population, and, politically, the group is 
underrepresented.
5 
Figure 3. Incidence of extreme poverty among indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants as a 













Source: ECLAC (2005a). 
Ethnoracial factors, therefore, are key traditional correlates of exclusion. To these must be added 
more recent, dynamic factors, including rapid economic change. Globalization can alter employment 
prospects in some industries and is not necessarily favorable to Latin America with its relatively high 
labor costs and low levels of technology, although demand for raw materials and energy, from China for 
example, does raise employment prospects in the corresponding sectors. 
Labor markets have been an important source of fragmentation and exclusion in the past 15 to 20 
years. Unemployment grew during this period, notably in the Southern Cone, Central America, and the 
Andean countries, whereas the average real wage tended to decline.
6 Wage disparities between workers of 
different educational backgrounds widened in the context of liberalization and technological change that 
                                                      
5 For example, Brazilians of African descent account for 45 percent of the population, but in 1995–1999 they occupied only 
15 seats in the national congress—an improvement over the previous period, when they occupied 4 seats, according to IDB data. 
6 Average wages (adjusted for purchasing power in U.S. dollars) remained constant or declined in most countries in the 
region in the 1990s, falling in Central America, the Andean region, and Mexico (Duryea, Jaramillo, and Pagés, 2003). The 
countries of the Southern Cone, in which the average wage increased, are also those where there were increases in 
unemployment. 













Costa Rica (2001) 
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accentuated the differences in relative demand for skilled and nonskilled workers. The percentage of 
workers who are paid “poverty wages” in the informal sector (US$1 per hour or less) is high, ranging 
from 40 percent in Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panamá, and Uruguay to more than 70 percent in Central 
America and Bolivia (Duryea, Jaramillo, and Pagés, 2003). By contrast, in some settings in East and 
Southeast Asia during the same period, differences in wage levels fell in a context of much more dynamic 
growth (Avalos and Savvides, 2003). 
The types of jobs that markets have created and the limited “labor market capability” of the large 
pool of people whose access to opportunities for human development is low have worked together to shift 
employment to unstable, low-productivity activities in the informal sector where workers lack health care 
coverage, social security, and job protection. The absence of economic security and the lack of control 
over events that shape individual welfare, in turn, can generate disaffection and the perception of unjust 
treatment, which can lead to violence and crime and, clearly, is not conducive to interpersonal trust (IDB, 
2007). 
The largeness of the informal sector in the region’s economies implies that important parts of 
society are cut off from the mainstream, functioning outside the scope of official institutions and formal 
markets. People in this condition may seek refuge in niches that at times may operate like “independent 
nations” with their own territory, norms, and systems of government, as observed in some favelas. 
Informality as a source of exclusion is an intrinsic characteristic of these groups; their labor relationships, 
property and housing, marital arrangements, and, in the case of undocumented individuals, very existence 
are informal. 
In this situation, the prospects and “satisfaction” of the majority whose incomes are in the lowest 
70 to 80 percent of the distribution are highly constrained. Arguably, this is a source of disillusionment, 
darkening people’s perception of their prospects for moving up.  
Other considerations influence perceptions too. As is widely known, there is a gap between the 
citizens’ lawful rights and the countries’ de facto ability to deliver basic services and such goods as 
impartial justice (IDB, 2005b). The ideal is the often invoked, but in practice limited condition of 
representative democracy and transparent rules. The reality is often a state of opaque dealings involving 
special interests, hidden powers, and governments unable or unwilling to intervene. The “symbols” 
holding together the polity under these conditions are not conducive to cooperation, reciprocity, and 
respect from its citizens. They are damaging to social cohesion, which needs a normative framework that 
provides state accountability as well as citizens’ equal rights, obligations, and opportunities. 
Symptoms of low levels of solidarity and cohesion are found in fiscal policy and the tax systems 
of the region, which are weak relative to those of industrialized economies (Table 2). Whereas in a 
sample of large OECD countries public revenues amounted to some 37 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in recent years, in Latin America they barely reached 20 percent. Latin American countries 
experience difficulty in raising revenue through income and property taxes, which are more progressive 
than indirect levies or taxes on goods and services. Income tax revenues as a share of GDP in Latin 
America are a third of the level recorded for G-7 countries, as seen in Table 2. 
Table 2. Tax revenue (percentage of GDP) 
 Total  tax 
revenues 






LAC  average  19.78  4.78  8.82 1.79 4.39 
G-7 average  36.99  13.54  9.51  0.08  10.54 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2001). 
Taxes and transfers have a significant effect in lowering income inequality in the countries of the 
OECD, but in Latin America the redistributive effect of taxation is low—one reason Gini coefficients are 
high and “fiscal legitimacy” affecting fiscal performance and democratic governance  is an issue (OECD,  
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2007). Taxes and transfers are factors in a cycle in which low revenue can lead to fiscal mismanagement, 
weak spending institutions, and low quality services that in turn spawn dissatisfaction and may underpin 
the reported low level of trust in public institutions.  Low trust in public institutions and dissatisfaction 
with the efficacy of public services, in turn, reduces tax morale and depresses tax collection. 
Latin America, as is widely known, has made important strides in many aspects of development 
in recent decades. Significant advances have occurred in macroeconomic and price stability and the 
public economic institutions; sector policies and rule reformation; and, more recently, in economic 
growth and poverty reduction (2007 was the fifth consecutive year with rising per capita growth). 
National poverty lines suggest that the UN goal of halving by 2015 (relative to 1990) the proportion of 
people living in extreme poverty may be achieved for the region as a whole and has already been met in 
Chile and Brazil (ECLAC, 2007b; Ferroni, 2007).
7 
The counterpoint to this situation is the reality of continued major challenges as well as shortfalls 
relative to Asian comparators, where savings, investment, and growth are much higher, as are poverty 
reduction rates (starting from higher initial levels of poverty) and progress toward the identified UN goal. 
The task, clearly, is to reduce inequality and exclusion, foment participatory and inclusive patterns of 
development and growth, and create conditions whereby growth reduces poverty more rapidly. The 
analysis below suggests that greater interpersonal trust and cohesion may help. 
 
 
                                                      
7 According to the most recent projections available and using national poverty lines, the “poverty” Millennium 
Development Goal (“MDG1”) seems reachable in 9 out of 17 countries analyzed (ECLAC, 2007b). There remains, therefore, a 
group of poorer countries that have not yet been able to place themselves on the virtuous development path that is needed for 
poverty reduction at the rate implied by the Goal.  
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4.  MEASURING SOCIAL COHESION 
The literature on social cohesion (and social capital) offers a variety of potential definitions and indicators 
for measuring the concepts, as seen above.
8 Our approach in this section is to construct an index of social 
cohesion that incorporates measures of social capital and the distribution of opportunities that conform 
reasonably well to our definition of these concepts and for which we are able to find data for Latin 
America. 
The two dimensions of social capital and the distribution of opportunities are in line with the 
definition of social cohesion set forth above: a capacity for cooperation and solidarity in society based on 
an equitable distribution of opportunities to participate in economic, social, and political life, as well as 
trust in societal rules, institutions, and fellow citizens. In the composite index that we propose, each of the 
two dimensions is measured by several variables, assessed in the form of either perceptions or hard data, 
as indicated in Table 3. 




Compliance with the law 
Interpersonal trust 




Income Gini coefficient 
Size of the middle class 
Education Gini coefficient 
Intergenerational mobility 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
The social capital dimension is composed of three indices that are believed to influence the 
capacity for cooperation at the macro and micro level: compliance with the law, interpersonal trust, and 
trust in institutions. When citizens place trust in the law and established public institutions, they are 
inclined to articulate their demands through formal institutions and to allow institutions and the law to 
mediate disagreements. They also trust public institutions to adopt policy solutions to pressing social 
problems. 
Conversely, when citizens fail to trust other citizens and rules and institutions, they are more 
readily inclined toward conflict, are less disposed to accept shared sacrifice, and have greater difficulty in 
reaching the agreements necessary to increase the supply of public goods. In addition, when interpersonal 
trust and trust in laws and institutions are weak, transaction costs are likely to be high and spontaneous 
cooperation relatively uncommon. We attempt to capture these effects with the elements of the social 
capital dimension of the index of social cohesion. 
                                                      
8 On social capital, for example, see Rothstein and Stolle (2002) and Rosemberg (1956) for generalized measures of trust. A 
case of widespread use and replication of trust is Putnam’s index of “civicness.” In Making Democracy Work, Putnam et al. 
(1993) use four indicators to measure the strength of civic involvement: associational life (number of voluntary organizations), 
incidence of newspaper readership, voter turnout at referenda, and the size of preference votes at elections. In Bowling Alone, 
Putnam (2000) introduces a composite index measuring the degree of people’s involvement in a range of civic and political 
activities, such as voter participation, involvement in civic groups and associations, participation in religious organizations, and 
philanthropy. Knack and Keefer (1997) use two indices to measure social capital: CIVIC, which tries to capture the level of civic 
cooperation, and TRUST, which is Rosemberg’s measure. Narayan and Pritchett (1999) calculate the social capital index as a 
weighted average of answers to questions measuring membership in various groups, the characteristics of these groups, and 
general trust-related attitudes.  
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We construct each of the measures for the social capital dimension on the basis of responses to 
the Latinobarómetro survey, which is administered annually in the 18 Latin American countries covered 
by the social cohesion index presented in this paper. We measure compliance with the law based on 
responses to the following question: “Would you say that (nationality, e.g., Chileans) comply with the 
law: very much, to a fair degree, seldom, or not at all?”
9 We measure interpersonal trust based on 
responses to the question examined in Figure 1 above: “Generally speaking, would you say that you can 
trust the majority of people or that one can never be too careful in dealing with others?” The trust in 
institutions index is an average of the responses to questions probing respondents’ level of confidence in 
the judiciary, congress, political parties, public administration, and the police. 
The distribution of opportunities dimension focuses on structural socioeconomic conditions that 
affect citizens’ ability to enjoy opportunities in the economic, social, and political spheres. This 
subdimension of the social cohesion index contains five indicators, which gauge the extent of social 
exclusion, the likelihood of social cooperation and/or social polarization (divisions between groups) and 
conflict, and the extent of opportunities for advancement. The indicators are the poverty incidence, the 
income Gini coefficient, the size of the middle class, the educational Gini coefficient, and 
intergenerational mobility. 
We measure the poverty incidence as the percentage of the population below the national poverty 
line. The larger the share of the poor in the population, the greater the hypothesized extent of exclusion 
and risk of alienation and polarization. 
Two other indicators of the distribution of opportunities dimension are the income Gini 
coefficient and the education Gini coefficient. High levels of poverty and income and educational 
inequalities imply low levels of integration for a large share of the population and greater risks of conflict 
in determining the allocation of public expenditures and the tax burden and the distribution of economic 
assets. 
A fourth indicator is the size of the middle class. We measure this by determining the share of 
total income earned by the income deciles 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. As suggested by Easterly (2001), a larger 
middle class is expected to increase the possibilities for societal cooperation in the provision of private 
and public goods, raise the scope for investment in human capital, and lessen the likelihood of 
distributional conflict and instability. 
The final indicator of the distribution of opportunities dimension is a measure of intergenerational 
mobility, or the extent to which children have the opportunity to achieve a higher socioeconomic status 
than their parents did. The measure, calculated in Behrman, Gaviria, and Székely (2001), uses household 
survey data to estimate the average correlation among siblings of an index of educational attainment that 
is calculated based on whether children are above or below the median schooling of their age cohort. A 
higher degree of correlation of this index among siblings is taken to imply greater influence of parental 
education on the education of children and lower levels of intergenerational mobility. 
Our effort in developing the index of social cohesion complements work undertaken by Jarque, 
Mejía, and Luengas (2005), who developed an index based on four components (poverty, equality of 
opportunities, exclusion, and solidarity) that have much in common with what we propose. A central 
aspect of the work of the cited authors was the desire to study the evolution of their index over time. They 
thus worked with objective and “hard” data that are available for multiple points in time. Our index, in 
turn, sets forth a more complete definition of social cohesion, the underlying conceptual dimensions of 
which are difficult to capture using available objective indicators alone. Thus, our index also uses 
perception data from surveys of public opinion and business executives to approximate the measurement 
of the concepts that we define. Despite the differences in the specification of the two indices, the 
correlation between them is high (.78); the ordering of the countries according to each of them is similar, 
though not identical; and the correlations with the development indicators (as presented in the next 
section) are comparable. 
                                                      
9 For a more complete description of the indicators used in the construction of the social cohesion index, see Appendix A.  
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In calculating the social cohesion index, once the raw values were obtained from their sources 
(see Appendix A), the intermediate variables were standardized on a scale of 0 to 1, based on the 
minimum and maximum theoretical values of each variable (x – min/max – min). After the variables were 
standardized, in those instances in which higher values of the variables signified less rather than more 
social cohesion, the normalized values were inverted (1 − x). Further, after we standardized the variables, 
we calculated the values of the two subindices, taking the average of the combined values for the 
variables. We calculated the social cohesion index as the average of the combined values of the two 
subindices. 
The hypothetical value of the social cohesion index and of each of its four subindex components 
ranges between 0 and 1. We used the most recent observations for the years 2001–2005 and, in line with 
our definition of social cohesion, attributed the same weight to each component. Thus, we indirectly 
weighted the individual indicators because whereas five indicators were used for the distribution of 
opportunities component, only three were used for the social capital component. 
The index should be considered an exploratory exercise. An ideal approach to developing an 
index of social cohesion would require an unambiguous definition, a theory that provides a basis for 
linking individual dimensions to the broader concept, and conceptually valid and reliable indicators for 
each of the dimensions. The second and third of these requirements cannot be fully met because of 
limitations in the available data
10 and in the empirical and theoretical knowledge with respect to the 
relative weight and interactions between the different components. Future efforts in building an index of 
social cohesion should be oriented in three directions in our view: (i) reflection at the conceptual level 
with regard to the structure and weighting of the subdimensions and indicators; (ii) the development of 
conceptually valid and reliable indicators that permit a more precise measurement of each one of the 
dimensions; and (iii) the validation of the index by extending the sample of countries to other regions of 
the world and producing the index for multiple points in time. 
                                                      
10 For example, it would be expected that the opportunities dimension of the social cohesion index is affected by individual 
and group characteristics such as race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, gender, and family origins. Many of the available proxies 
for some of these traits, such as the degree of ethnolinguistic fragmentation, however, are of questionable validity and reliability 
and thus have not been used in the present exercise. First, the measures that have been used in previous empirical studies are now 
out of date and of doubtful accuracy, given Latin America’s considerable demographic changes in the past decades. Second, if a 
measure related to discrimination and exclusion based on ethnolinguistic background were to be included, it would need to be 
more subtle than one focused solely on the ethnic composition of the population. To reflect the degree of exclusion, it would need 
to account for the extent to which such distinctions are in fact correlated with disadvantages with respect to education, income, 
employment, and distrust between persons. Otherwise, the index would risk being overly deterministic, presuming that societies 
with comparatively high degrees of ethnic fragmentation are doomed to be noncohesive. The index would have to allow for the 
possibility that higher levels of integration and inclusion could be fostered through the efforts of civil society or public action 
(e.g., by ending legal discrimination, by affirmative action policies, and by progressive public spending on education, health care, 
and social protection).  
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5.  SOCIAL COHESION AND DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES 
In this section, we use the social cohesion index to examine the degree to which social cohesion is 
connected with the capacity of countries to promote economic growth, apply new technologies, 
implement effective development policies, and maintain a stable and predictable political and policy 
environment. The analysis is limited to bivariate correlations, thus it points only to associations rather 
than demonstrating causal relationships. 
Relatively few empirical studies have examined the relationship between the broad concept of 
social cohesion and development outcomes. However, a fairly large number of studies have investigated 
the effects on development of related concepts and measures, such as social capital, inequality, 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, crime and violence, and political instability and social conflict. 
Putnam and colleagues’ influential work examining the effects of social networks, norms, and 
trust on the effectiveness of local government and economic performance in regions of Italy (Helliwell 
and Putnam, 1995; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993) has fueled recent interest in the development 
significance of social capital. This research, and other studies building upon it, hypothesized that higher 
levels of trust and stronger civic values contribute to higher rates of growth by lowering transaction costs 
(as noted earlier), increasing trust in government, raising investment rates, making government more 
efficient in providing public services, increasing cooperation in the provision of public goods, and 
enhancing governmental accountability. 
Several cross-national empirical studies have found social capital variables to have a positive 
influence on economic growth and related development outcomes (Helliwell, 1996a, 1996b; Knack, 2000, 
2001; Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Putnam, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001). For instance, 
Steve Knack and Philip Keefer (1997), in their cross-national study of 29 advanced and developing 
economies, found a positive link between interpersonal trust and economic performance as well as 
between trust and indicators of governmental efficiency and corruption. Working with a larger sample of 
countries, Paul Zak and Knack (2001) found that the association with growth became substantially more 
robust to changes in time period and in the specification of control variables. But, other studies, using 
different samples, some restricted to OECD countries and Asian economies (Helliwell, 1996a; Knack, 
2001) and others restricted to Canadian provinces and U.S. states (Helliwell, 1996b), failed to find a 
relationship between trust and/or group membership and economic growth. On the whole, there is some 
empirical support for an association between social capital and growth when social capital is 
operationalized in terms of measures of trust and civic values, but not when organizational membership is 
used (Knack, 2001). 
The second dimension of the social cohesion index—equality in the distribution of 
opportunities—has also been linked to economic performance. Several different channels of influence of 
inequality on growth have been examined, including increased pressures to adopt redistributive and 
economically inefficient fiscal policies (Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Bertola, 
1993; Persson and Tabellini, 1994), increased sociopolitical instability (Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Perotti, 
1996), lower rates of individual investment (Perotti, 1994), lower domestic demand (Murphy, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1989), greater incentives to engage in rent-seeking activities (Ben-Habib and Rustichini, 
1991; Fay, 1993), more uncertain property rights (Keefer and Knack, 2002), and weaker institutions 
(Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock, 2005). Based on these studies, empirical evidence appears to lend 
greatest support to inequality’s effects on growth being channeled through higher levels of political 
instability, lower rates of investment, higher levels of rent seeking, and lower cooperation in the provision 
of public goods (Clarke, 1995; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). 
Drawing on our index of social cohesion and focusing on a sample of 18 Latin American 
countries, we find that the rate of per capita economic growth between 1990 and 2005 has tended to be 
higher in those countries with larger values on the social cohesion index (Figure 4). The correlation is 
0.48 and is significant at the 0.05 level. Between the two dimensions of the index, the distribution of 
opportunities subindex appears to be more closely associated with growth performance (0.48 and  
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significant at 0.05 level). The social capital index, by itself, is positively correlated with growth (0.38); 
but, at least for this 18-country sample, the relationship is not statistically significant (Figures 5 and 6). 
Figure 4. Growth versus social cohesion 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Growth figures calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Figure 5. Growth versus distribution of opportunities subindex 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Growth figures calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  
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Figure 6. Growth versus social capital subindex 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Growth figures calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Correlation is not significant. 
Social cohesion may not only contribute to higher growth rates, it also is likely to affect the 
sustainability of growth in the face of external shocks and the duration and social impact of economic 
downturns. In addition to the importance of human capital, which is captured in the first component of the 
social cohesion index, social capital is key—and, in this respect, civil society, political participation, and 
trust in public institutions are vital. In times of crisis the capacity of society to organize itself (on the basis 
of high levels of social capital) produces externalities that can be essential for attending to the basic needs 
of the population and favors the chances of an economic recovery.
11 Lower levels of societal polarization 
and higher levels of social solidarity and trust in representative institutions lower the risk of distributive 
struggles and increase the possibility that social groups will reach agreement on sharing the costs of 
policy adjustment, thereby making a soft landing more probable (Rodrik, 1999). 
There may be a channel between social cohesion and growth in that social cohesion increases the 
capacity of societies to incorporate and develop new technologies in the production of economic goods 
and services. Cohesive and trusting societies provide broader opportunities for advanced education, 
higher-quality schools, and greater incentives for individual investment in developing job skills. In 
addition, as seen above, to the extent that social cohesion lowers policy uncertainty, reduces economic 
volatility, and enhances the security of intellectual and physical property, it is also likely to foster higher 
rates of foreign investment and overall investment in new technologies. 
In fact, an index of technological innovation
12 (one of the subindices of the Global 
Competiveness Index published in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report), 
appears to be higher in those countries with higher levels of social cohesion (Figure 7). If social cohesion 
contributes to better investment in human capital, higher levels of foreign investment, more efficient 
incorporation of technological advances, and the growth of research and development capabilities, it also 
                                                      
11 See Kliksberg (2006) for an analysis of the role of volunteer action. 
12 This index aggregates measures assessing countries’ innovative capacity, capacity to absorb technology transfers, and 
level of communication technology. For more information, see Appendix A.  
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will tend to promote greater responsiveness to the demands and opportunities of an increasingly 
knowledge-based global economy. The role of social cohesion during periods of technological 
transformation has been highlighted by Lundvall (2002), for example, who (for the case of Denmark) 
shows the value of cohesion in fostering interactive learning and linking workers to competence building 
in “innovation friendly” environments. The distribution of opportunities subindex is also highly correlated 
with the technology index (0.66). The social capital subindex is positively correlated with this index, but 
in this case the relationship is significant at only the 0.10 level (Figures 8 and 9). 
The lower capacity for technological innovation in Latin America is evident from the fact that the 
proportion of researchers in the workforce is significantly lower in Latin America than it is in more 
advanced countries. The available data also show that this gap is growing. The number of researchers per 
thousand persons in the economically active population increased less than 10 percent between 1995 and 
2003. In the same period, the rate of increase was more than 20 percent in developed countries. In China, 
the number of researchers is growing three times faster than the labor force as a whole (IDB, 2006). 
Figure 7. Technological innovation capacity versus social cohesion 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Index of technological innovation from World Economic Forum (2006). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
In contrast to more advanced countries, where the majority of researchers work in the private 
sector, in Latin America they are employed mainly by universities and public institutes. However, in 
Brazil and Mexico, for example, the proportion of researchers employed by the private sector is rising 
rapidly. The level of investment in research and development (as a percentage of GDP) also increased in 
these two countries. In Brazil, for instance, investment in research and development is approximately 1 
percent of GDP. This contrasts with the declining trend observed for most countries in the region. 
As previous studies have demonstrated, high levels of social cohesion should also be reflected in 
the greater efficiency of government institutions and policymaking processes. More trusting and 
associative societies are also likely to have public institutions that are more effective because they will 
tend to be characterized by higher levels of political participation, stronger norms of civic cooperation, 
and more efficient vertical accountability mechanisms. Fragmented societies characterized by internal 
divisions and low levels of trust face larger constraints on government decision making than do more  
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cohesive societies. When there is a multiplicity of groups with sharply conflicting interests seeking to 
influence public policy and public institutions for their own benefit, transaction costs are increased, rent-
seeking behaviors become more prevalent, and governmental institutions are likely to be less efficient. 
Figure 8. Technological innovation capacity versus distribution of opportunities subindex 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Index of technological innovation from World Economic Forum (2006). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Figure 9. Technological innovation capacity versus social capital subindex 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Index of technological innovation from World Economic Forum (2006). 
Correlation is not significant.  
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We find an aggregate measure of the effectiveness of governmental institutions to be closely 
correlated with the social cohesion index (Figure 10). The social capital and distribution of opportunities 
subindices are associated in the same degree as the overall social cohesion index with this measure of 
governmental effectiveness (Figures 11 and 12). 
Figure 10. Effectiveness of governmental institutions versus social cohesion 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Authors compiled the index of effectiveness of governmental institutions on the basis of data from 
IDB (2005b), Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003), and Latinobarómetro (2006). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  
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Figure 11. Effectiveness of governmental institutions versus distribution of opportunities subindex 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Index of effectiveness of governmental institutions compiled by authors on the basis of data from 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003), IDB (2005b), and Latinobarómetro (2006). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
Figure 12. Effectiveness of governmental institutions versus social capital subindex 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Authors compiled the index of effectiveness of governmental institutions on the basis of data from 
IDB (2005b), and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003), Latinobarómetro (2006). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  
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Ineffective institutions and inefficient decision making often result in poor quality development 
policies. Regardless of its particular contents, for a public policy to be effective it must meet a number of 
requirements (IDB, 2005b). Policy must (1) be stable, meaning it must be consistent over time; (2) be 
flexible enough to adjust to shifting contexts; (3) be designed in a way that considers implementation 
requirements and is consistent with other policies in the same area; (4) be implemented effectively; (5) 
serve general public interests; and (6) be efficient with respect to the allocation of resources; often how 
much is spent is less important than how the spending is done. 
For these requirements to be met, the persons involved in making decisions must be able to reach 
intertemporal agreements on the core elements of state policy. Intertemporality depends on reasonable 
stability in the identification of a country’s development objectives, which hinges on the absence of 
frequent and dramatic changes in the composition of the government and the congress and a limited 
degree of social and political polarization. Obtaining durable agreements requires a considerable capacity 
to forge consensus, which is facilitated when the elements of society feel that they belong to the same 
community; that is, when society is cohesive. 
The implementation of public policies and the advance of a country toward higher levels of well-
being require the country to be able not only to generate resources but also to spend them efficiently. 
Limitations with respect to budgetary policymaking and management are among the most important 
constraints faced by low- and middle-income countries. Revenues collected by many countries are low, 
and a significant share of revenues is typically allocated inefficiently, either due to inefficient 
administrative structures, poor policy design, or poor implementation, or due to diverting resources to 
other purposes. Fragmented societies whose citizens have low levels of trust are more prone to 
competitive rent seeking given the greater focus on group interests than on common interests and the 
weakness of civic norms and vertical accountability as constraints on opportunistic behavior. 
Thus, we find that levels of social cohesion are associated with an index of the quality of 
development policies, comprising measures of the efficiency of public policies and the extensiveness of 
governmental corruption (Figure 13). This index is highly correlated with both subindices of the social 
cohesion index, supporting the notion that both social polarization and weak norms of civic cooperation 
have a negative impact on the quality of public policies (Figures 14 and 15). 
Figure 13. Quality of development policies versus social cohesion 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Index of quality of development policies compiled by the authors on the basis of data from 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003), Latinobarómetro (2006), and World Economic Forum (2006). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Figure 14. Quality of development policies versus distribution of opportunities subindex 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Index of quality of development policies compiled by the authors on the basis of data from 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003), Latinobarómetro (2006), and World Economic Forum (2006). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Figure 15. Quality of development policies versus social capital subindex 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Index of the quality of development policies compiled by the authors on the basis of data from 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003), Latinobarómetro (2006), and World Economic Forum (2006). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Taxation is one area that the extent of social cohesion is likely to affect, as discussed earlier. The 
willingness to pay taxes depends considerably on the benefits that people expect to receive in return and 
the strength of ties to the community. Citizens of countries with high levels of social cohesion are likely 
to be more willing to contribute to the common pool of public resources, since they expect to share in the 
benefits of public programs and investments funded by them and because they feel a sense of obligation 
to the community in which they live. In weakly cohesive societies, taxpayers may resent the situation 
whereby an important share of public resources goes to groups with which they do not identify. 
High-quality public policies require technical agencies that are able to design and properly 
implement policy decisions. This capability implies an independent and professional civil service in 
which civil servants are hired and promoted on the basis of merit rather than partisan political 
connections. Only in this context can an effective and neutral public administration be ensured. An active 
and organized citizenry that raises the demand for effective government can facilitate the transition 
toward a more professional bureaucracy. 
Another potential channel between social cohesion and growth is political instability and social 
conflict. Some empirical studies have shown a positive association between economic and social 
inequality and distributional conflict and political instability, which in turn affects growth (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996; Perotti, 1996). Political instability negatively affects the predictability of the policy 
environment, the rate and quality of investment, the time horizons of political actors, and the 
sustainability of public policies. We find that an index of political stability and violence is closely 
associated with the social cohesion index as well as with the distribution of opportunities subindex 
(Figures 16 and 17). In the case of the social capital subindex, the correlation is not statistically 
significant (only significant at the 0.10 level) (Figure 18). 
Figure 16. Political stability versus social cohesion 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Index of political stability and violence from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). 
Note: Higher scores on the index of political instability and violence imply lower levels of instability and violence. 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  
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Figure 17. Political stability versus distribution of opportunities subindex 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Index of political stability and violence from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Figure 18. Political stability versus social capital subindex 
 
Source: Authors' compilation. Index of political stability and violence from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). 
Correlation is not significant.  
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Thus, this exploratory analysis of the development significance of social cohesion and its two 
dimensions in Latin America has provided some empirical validation for the need to focus on these 
concepts for purposes of both academic research and policymaking. As we discuss in the next section, the 
findings presented, as well as those in the literature, highlight the need for a balanced and integrated 





6.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The topics of social cohesion, social capital, and inequality appear with increasing frequency in the debate 
over how to advance welfare and development, how to build inclusive societies, and how to promote 
equitable and sustainable growth. The analysis presented in this paper confirms some of the findings of 
previous works and points to linkages between the degree of cohesion and key capacities, such as the 
ability of society to achieve dynamic growth, adapt, and flexibly respond to market demands, innovate 
and incorporate new technologies, implement policies, and maintain a stable and predictable political and 
policy environment. 
How then to promote social cohesion? Conceptually, there is a difficulty that stems from the lack 
of an agreed actionable and operational definition of this notion, however intuitively sound. In practical 
terms, there is the problem of setting priorities and the much greater challenge of designing and 
implementing policies and processes that are capable of changing realities that may be entrenched and 
have shaped society for many years. 
Because each country’s history and circumstances are unique, general prescriptions are unlikely 
to work. The task is to set in motion virtuous cycles that foster the capacity to reach consensus and 
strengthen the community by promoting solidarity and inclusion. From the analysis in this paper, the 
reduction of inequality, the promotion of economic opportunities, and the deepening of representation and 
democratic governance are all-important. We briefly take up each of these aspects below. 
Reduce Inequality and Increase Opportunities 
Sustained inequality can produce political instability, conflict, rent seeking, and low levels of investment 
and cooperation in the provision of public goods. One of Latin America’s top priorities, therefore, is to 
readjust the distributional structure of income and opportunities among individuals and groups. This 
means shrinking income and education gaps, raising labor market capability, reducing poverty, expanding 
the middle class, and creating conditions for social mobility to occur. 
To reach these objectives, the region must invest in human capital, concentrating in particular on 
the groups with the largest gaps in access, without neglecting the workforce’s training and schooling 
needs at all levels. Investment in more competitive educational systems will facilitate opportunities for 
participation and upward mobility, especially for the young, and should dampen the incidence of violence 
and crime. 
The region also needs to make its labor markets more flexible and promote job creation as part of 
a strategy to improve the response capacity to ever-evolving market realities and needs. The challenges 
here include creating the conditions needed for “good” jobs to arise and be filled (to reverse the shift of 
employment to low-productivity activities in the informal sector) and expanding social protection 
systems, insurance plans, and safety nets for those out of work or working “informally” in low-paying 
jobs. 
The greatest challenge of all, however, lies in overcoming the forces and processes that reproduce 
exclusion. The task is to achieve equality in access and opportunities for excluded groups by bringing 
these groups into the political, institutional, and community structures that make the decisions affecting 
their prospects. The envelope of measures just identified will help. But, in the end, this is about more far-
reaching transformations that focus on rights that need to be respected, citizenship that needs to be 
deepened, social guarantees that need to be provided, and a new social contract that needs to be forged. 
Improve Solidarity 
The elements to address in a new social contract include solidarity and redistributive equity, both of 
which need to be considered in the next round of fiscal reforms. Over the past two decades, fiscal reforms 
have focused largely on improving administration and making tax structures simpler, more neutral, and  
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better suited to international economic integration. Issues of redistributive equity have been left mostly to 
other policy instruments. They need to be taken up in the fiscal domain going forward. To improve the 
equity and revenue-raising potential of tax systems, countries should reassess the distributive effects of 
their systems; increase direct taxation and revenue mobilization; improve horizontal equity; and tie tax 
policy to citizen benefits, with a special focus on expenditures that reach the vulnerable in the middle-
income range as well as the poor. 
Transform Governance 
It emerges from the analysis in this paper that social capital and social cohesion cannot be delinked from 
citizenship and truly representative democratic processes and institutions. Some of the aspects of interest 
here include the notion of equality under the law and the administration of justice, and transparent rules 
that are conducive to society-wide bargaining and participation. Thought needs to be given to the ways 
and means to generate capacity to reach intertemporal agreements, keep clientelism at bay, and formulate 
and apply state policies (sometimes called national projects) with a long-term focus. 
Other aspects in the realm of governance include improvements in the quality of the institutions 
that serve the population as well as increases in the quality and coverage of delivered services and public 
goods to make it possible to reverse the situation of rampant distrust in public institutions that the region’s 
opinion surveys document. 
To conclude, it is difficult (indeed, by the analysis of this paper, quite probably impossible) to 
achieve sustainable and equitable growth and “development for all” under conditions where inequality is 
entrenched and distrust the norm. Deepening social cohesion through changes that foster cooperation and 
a sense of solidarity and belonging can come to the rescue and lend a hand in the pursuit of development 
benefits and welfare widely shared.  
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES AND SOURCES OF 
INFORMATION FOR THE SOCIAL COHESION INDEX AND DEVELOPMENT AND 
GOVERNANCE OUTCOME INDICATORS 
SOCIAL COHESION INDEX 
Distribution of Opportunities Subindex 
Incidence of poverty 
We measure incidence of poverty as the percentage of the population below the national poverty line for 
each country, as calculated by ECLAC. In constructing the index, we invert the values of this indicator so 
that higher values indicate less poverty and broader opportunities. The data on the incidence of poverty 
are taken from Jarque, Mejía, and Luengas (2005). The sources used in this study are ECLAC (2002, 
2004b). 
Gini coefficient 
We use the standard Gini coefficient, which, theoretically, ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 implying perfect 
equality and 1 perfect inequality (all the wealth concentrated in one person). In constructing the index, we 
invert the values of this indicator so that higher values indicate less inequality and broader opportunities. 
The data for the Gini coefficients are taken from Jarque, Mejía, and Luengas (2005) based on ECLAC 
(2003). 
Size of the middle class 
The measurement of the size of the middle class comes from adding the total percentage of income earned 
in deciles 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the population. The source used for this measure is the Socioeconomic 
Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS, 2006; World Bank, 2006). 
Educational Gini coefficient 
Like the income Gini coefficient, we calculate this indicator from the distribution of the level of schooling 
attained by the population over 15 years of age. In constructing the index, we invert the values of this 
indicator so that higher values indicate less inequality and broader opportunities. The source used for this 
measure  is Jarque, Mejía, and Luengas (2005). 
Intergenerational mobility 
This indicator was created by examining information from household surveys related to the educational 
attainment of its children. Creating the index involves two steps. First, an index of educational attainment 
was created based on whether children are above or below the median schooling of their age cohort. 
Second, the correlation among siblings for this index of attainment was calculated based on the sample 
population of families with at least two children. The higher the correlation, the greater the importance of 
the school background of the family to explain the school achievement of adolescents who live with their 
parents and the lower the rate of intergenerational mobility of the country. We invert this index so that 
larger values indicate greater social mobility. The source used in this study is Behrman, Gaviria, and 
Székely (2001). 
Social Capital Subindex 
Compliance with the law 
We base this indicator on the following question from Latinobarómetro: “Would you say that nationality 
(e.g., Chileans) comply with the law. Very much, to a fair degree, seldom, or not at all?” We average the 
country means of the responses for 2002, 2003, and 2005, standardized on a scale of 0 to 1, and invert  
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them so that higher values reflect greater trust. The source used in this study is Latinobarómetro (2002, 
2003, 2005). 
Interpersonal trust 
We base this indicator on the following question in the Latinobarómetro: “Generally speaking, would you 
say that you can trust the majority of people or that one can never be too careful in dealing with others?” 
For 2003, 2004, and 2005, the proportion of all those surveyed who answered that “you can trust the 
majority of people” was calculated. The index is the average for the three years. The source used in this 
study is Latinobarómetro (2003, 2004, 2005). 
Trust in institutions 
This index averages the responses to the Latinobarómetro question about the trust that those surveyed 
have in a number of state institutions. “Please, look at this card and tell me, for each of the groups, 
institutions, or persons mentioned in the list, how much trust you have in each: A lot, some, little, or 
none.” The index on trust in institutions incorporated responses for the following institutions: judiciary, 
police, congress, political parties, and public administration. We calculate the index by averaging the 
country means for each institution for 2003, 2004, and 2005, averaging across the five institutions, 
standardizing this result on a scale from 0 to 1, and inverting this number so that higher values reflect 
greater trust. The source used in this study is Latinobarómetro (2003, 2004, 2005). 
DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE OUTCOME INDICATORS 
Economic Growth 
Average annual per capita GDP growth in the period 1990–2005. The source used in this study is World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2007). 
Technology index 
This indicator combines two to three subindices, depending on whether the country is considered a leader 
in technological innovation. For countries that are not, the technology index comprises subindices for 
innovation, capacity to absorb technology transfers, and information and communications technologies. 
The weighting for the first of these is 1/8, the second 3/8, and the third 1/2. We construct these subindices 
from a combination of responses to questions in the Executive Opinion Survey and from “hard data” from 
a number of sources. The source used in this study is World Economic Forum (2006). 
Effectiveness of Governmental Institutions 
This index is a simple average of the following three indicators. 
Government effectiveness index 
This measurement is a composite index of many of the available indicators for government effectiveness, 
including cabinet stability, bureaucratic quality (including the extent of red tape), and the level of waste in 
government spending. We create this aggregation of indicators from a variety of sources using a statistical 
technique known as unobserved components analysis. Some of the indicators are survey based, others are 
based on expert assessments. The sources used in this study are World Bank Institute 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). 
Efficiency of public policy 
This indicator calculates the extent to which policy reflects a socially and economically productive use of 
scarce resources, based on two components. The first, “Waste in Government Spending,” is based on a 
question from the Executive Opinion Survey of the Global Competitiveness Report of the World 
Economic Forum. The second measures whether resources are focused on where they are most effective  
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and comes from the State Capabilities Survey carried out by the IDB. The source used in this study is 
IDB (2005b). 
Functioning of public institutions 
We base this indicator on the average of all answers to the following question in the Latinobarómetro: 
“Generally speaking, what would you say your opinion is of the way public institutions operate? Would 
you say that they work very well, well, all right, badly, or very badly?” We calculate the indicator on the 
average values of the answers for each country, standardized on a scale of 0 to 1, considering a possible 
rating of answers from 1 to 5; we then invert the standardized score so that higher numbers reflect 
opinions on the operations of public institutions that are more favorable. The source used in this study is  
Latinobarómetro (2005). 
Quality of Development Policies 
This index is a simple average of the following four indicators. 
Government efficacy in reducing poverty and inequality 
This is based on the following question in the Global Competitiveness Report, 2005–2006: “In your 
country, how effective are the efforts of the government to reduce poverty and deal with income 
inequality on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 = ineffective and 7 = effective?” We calculated the indicator by 
taking the average value of the responses for each country, standardized on a scale of 0 to 1. The source 
used in this study is World Economic Forum (2006). 
Confidence that tax revenues are being well spent 
This is based on the following question from the 2005 Latinobarómetro: “With regard to taxation in 
general, do you trust that the money raised by taxation is well spent by the state? Yes or no?” The 
indicator is the proportion of people who answered yes. The source used in this study is Latinobarómetro 
(2005). 
Control of corruption 
This is a composite index of many of the available indicators dealing with the control of corruption. 
Derived from a variety of sources, it was calculated using a statistical technique known as unobserved 
components analysis. Some indicators are based on survey material, others on expert opinions. The World 
Bank indicator is standardized on a scale of 0 to 1, based on the minimum and maximum values found in 
the global sample of countries. The source used in this study is World Bank Institute 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp). For a description of the indicator, see Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). 
Corruption among public officials 
This is based on the following question from the 2005 Latinobarómetro: “Imagine that the number of 
public officials in (your country) was 100 and you had to say how many of these 100 are corrupt. How 
many would you say were corrupt?” We calculate the indicator using the average proportion of public 
officials considered to be corrupt by those surveyed, standardized on a scale of 0 to 1. The source used in 
this study is Corporación Latinobarómetro (2005). 
Political Stability and the Absence of Violence 
This measurement combines indicators based on survey material and expert opinions. The World Bank 
indicator is standardized on a scale of 0 to 1, based on the minimum and maximum values found in the 
global sample of countries. The sources used in this study are 
World Bank Institute (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2003).  
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APPENDIX B: UNDERLYING INDEX VALUES OF THE TWO COMPONENTS OF THE SOCIAL COHESION INDEX 




















Argentina  0.585 2002  0.410 2002  0.299 2005 0.724 2000 0.470  1998 0.498 
Bolivia  0.376 2002  0.386 2002  0.248 2002 0.487 2000 0.470  1999 0.393 
Brazil  0.625 2001  0.361 2001  0.247 2003 0.565 2000 0.450  1999 0.450 
Chile  0.812 2003  0.450 2003  0.261 2003 0.657 2000 0.550  1998 0.546 
Colombia  0.486 2002  0.425 2002  0.254 2000 0.527 2000 0.490  1999 0.436 
Costa  Rica  0.797 2002  0.512 2002  0.306 2003 0.575 2000 0.490  1998 0.536 
Dominican 
Republic  0.551 2002  0.456 2002  0.285 2004 0.399 2000 0.520  1998 0.442 
Ecuador  0.510 2002  0.487 2002  0.289 2003 0.553 2000 0.450  1998 0.458 
El  Salvador  0.511 2001  0.475 2001  0.303 2003 0.487 2000 0.390  1998 0.433 
Guatemala  0.398 2002  0.457 2002  0.271 2002 0.385 2000 0.450  1998 0.392 
Honduras 0.227 2002  0.412 2002  0.270 2003 0.538 2000 0.500  1999 0.389 
Mexico  0.606 2002  0.486 2002  0.296 2002 0.638 2000 0.460  1998 0.497 
Nicaragua  0.307 2001  0.421 2001  0.269 2001 0.482 2000 0.430  1998 0.382 
Panamá  0.660 2002  0.439 2002  0.262 2003 0.662 2000 0.590  1999 0.523 
Paraguay 0.390 2001  0.430 2000  0.250 2003 0.625 2000 0.630  1998 0.465 
Peru  0.452 2001  0.475 2001  0.284 2003 0.628 2000 0.520  2000 0.472 
Uruguay  0.846 2002  0.545 2002  0.319 2004 0.654 2000 0.590  1998 0.591 




Table B.2. Social capital subindex 
Country 
Compliance 













Argentina  0.275 2005  0.215 2005  0.295 2005  0.261 0.379 
Bolivia  0.333 2005  0.186 2005  0.239 2005  0.253 0.323 
Brazil  0.383 2005  0.045 2005  0.367 2005  0.265 0.357 
Chile  0.422 2005  0.146 2005  0.392 2005  0.320 0.433 
Colombia  0.364 2005  0.184 2005  0.364 2005  0.304 0.370 
Costa  Rica  0.399 2005  0.111 2005  0.362 2005  0.291 0.413 
Dominican  Republic  0.342 2005  0.185 2005  0.385 2005  0.304 0.373 
Ecuador  0.378 2005  0.188 2005  0.213 2005  0.260 0.359 
El  Salvador  0.373 2005  0.181 2005  0.322 2005  0.292 0.363 
Guatemala  0.328 2005  0.178 2005  0.234 2005  0.247 0.319 
Honduras  0.344 2005  0.175 2005  0.345 2005  0.288 0.339 
Mexico  0.311 2005  0.199 2005  0.282 2005  0.264 0.381 
Nicaragua  0.336 2005  0.137 2005  0.236 2005  0.236 0.309 
Panamá  0.399 2005  0.206 2005  0.311 2005  0.305 0.414 
Paraguay  0.278 2005  0.101 2005  0.274 2005  0.217 0.341 
Peru  0.290 2005  0.155 2005  0.260 2005  0.235 0.353 
Uruguay  0.516 2005  0.319 2005  0.439 2005  0.425 0.508 
Venezuela  0.389 2005  0.191 2005  0.358 2005  0.313 0.407 
aThis index is an average of the country means of responses from the 2002, 2003, and 2005 Latinobarómetro surveys. 
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